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The Proposed Administrative Procedure Act"
BY ALLEN MOORE*

The proposed Federal Administrative Procedure Act, sponsored by
the American Bar Association and drafted by its Special Committee on
Administrative Law, has been said to provide the most fertile ground
for statesmanship in the field of the administration of justice since the
Judiciary Act of 1789. This view seems not only to be a bit of overemphasis but it is quite in line with the approach of the American Bar
Association toward the growth of administrative law in the past ten or
twelve years, during which repeated efforts have been made to obtain
legislation, such as the Walter-Logan bill, which, if enacted, might easily have thwarted a necessary and inevitable development of the administrative process.
The bill under consideration here is entitled "A Bill to Improve
the Administration of Justice by Prescribing Fair Administrative Procedure," and was recently introduced in the Senate by Senator McCarran
of Nevada and in the House by Congressman Sumtners of Texas.'
The bill marks the culmination of more than five years of continuous study and drafting by the Special Committee on Administrative Law
and by the association itself following the veto by the President of the
Walter-Logan bill, the association's first effort to secure such legislation.
The bill is-also said to mark the commencement of a new responsibility upon association members and lawyers generally to promote the
enactment of the measure.
This paper is an attempt to evaluate the merits of the proposed act
for the members of the Colorado Bar Association at this, its annual
meeting, in order that they may be more fully advised and in a better
position to make an intelligent determination when the association considers a resolution to approve the bill and urge its enactment, and
thereby, as individual members, responding to President Henderson's
appeal to "constitute yourself a committee of one to do what you can
to aid in securing favorable consideration of the association's immediate
tAn address before the Colorado Bar Association, October 14, 1944.
*Of the Denver Bar. Regional Rationing Attorney, Office of Price Administration.
1
S. 2030 and H. R. 5081, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.
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objective-the improvement of the administration of justice through
the adoption of a statutory framework of fair administrative procedure."
It is indeed a grave responsibility which confronts the bar associations and the lawyers of this country. We should make certain that the
proposed act would actually improve the administration of justice and
that it truly prescribes fair administrative procedure. We should be
certain that the public interest and welfare will properly be protected;
that the act will not impede the normal development of administrative
law, and that it is not an effort to emasculate the growth of new instrumentalities designed to meet the will of the people in a rapidly expanding
society in periods of stress and strain.
These points are raised because frequently in recent years advocates
of this type of legislation have used, somewhat carelessly, cliches such as
"administrative absolutism," "bureaucracy," "dictatorship," "the issue
here is constitutional government vs. bureaucratic dictatorship," "the
New Despotism," this "Wonderland of Bureacracy," this "pattern for
tyranny."
Now, what is this thing which has so frightened members of the
Congress, bar associations, lawyers, the press and some of the general
public? What is this thing which brings about such violent attacks?
Are the very foundations of our government being undermined? Are
such fears well-founded? I think not. "Administrative law," "the administrative process," "administrative tribunals" do not appear so sinister if one understands something of the origins, developments, and
characteristics of the administrative process and its proper evaluation in
our scheme of government.
It therefore seems appropriate before giving a synopsis of the proposed (Administrative Procedure) act to give something of the background of administrative law in this country, as well as to trace the steps
leading to the introduction of the McCarran-Sumners bill.
James M. Landis in the Storrs Lectures given at Yale University
in 1936, later published in book form as "The Administrative Process,"
says in the introduction:
"The last century has witnessed the rise of a new instrument
of government, the administrative tribunal. In its mature form it
is difficult to find its parallels in our earlier political history; its
development seems indigenous. The rapidity of its growth, the
significance of its powers, and the implications of its being are such
as to require notice of the extent to which this new 'administrative
law' is weaving itself more and more into our governmental fabric.
"In terms of political theory, the administrative process
springs from the inadequacy of a simple tri-partite form of government to deal with modern problems. It represents a striving to

DICTA
adapt governmental technique that still divides under three rubrics
to modern needs and, at the same time, to preserve those elements
of responsibility and those conditions of balance that have distinguished Anglo-American government."
Landis here refers to the doctrine of separation of powers, an old
political maxim, based upon the division of governmental powers in
the federal and state constitutions into the legislative, executive and judicial. This tripartite ideal of government, and the checks and balances to
be found in our constitutions have resulted in fineness of logic-chopping
by our courts, to uphold the separation of powers, and for a tendency
on their part to establish new categories of quasi-legislative and quasijudicial powers when they find an executive agency infringing on the
powers of either of the other branches of government.
Dean Landis then states:
"The insistence upon the compartmentalization of power
along triadic lines gave way in the nineteenth century to the exigencies of governance. Without too much political theory but with
a keen sense of the practicalities of the situation, agencies were created whose functions embraced the three aspects of government.
Rulemaking, enforcement, and the disposition of competing claims
made by contending parties were all intrusted to them. As the
years passed, the process grew. These agencies, tribunals, and rulemaking boards were for the sake of convenience distinguished from
the existing governmental bureaucracies by terming them 'administrative.' The law the courts permitted them to make was named
'administraitve law,' so that now the process in all its component
parts can be appropriately termed the 'administrative process'."
The term "administrative law" thus came into general use and the
administrative process has resulted in a voluminous literature and the
inclusion of courses in "Administrative Law" in most of the law schools.
Since the administrative process deals with the relationships of
governmental agencies to persons it has necessarily been associated with
the term "bureaucracy." From bureaucracy to autocracy to dictatorship
is a simple transition in some people's thinking. The literature of the
subject abounds with fulminations. It treats the administrative process
as if it were an antonym of that supposedly immemorial and sacred right
of every English man, and every American, the legal palladium of "the
rule of law." The process is denounced by worthy lawyers, legislators,
bar associations and politicians as heralding the death knell of ancient
liberties and privileges. The independent administrative agencies of the
federal government have been said to constitute "a headless fourth
branch" of the government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers whose institution did "violence to the
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basic theory of the American Constitution that there should be three
major branches of the government, and only three."
Such glorification of the doctrine of the separation of powers obscures rather than clarifies thought. In spite of this chorus of abuse and
tirade, the growth of the administrative process shows or will show little
signs of being halted.
The administrative process in the federal government is not new.
On the contrary it is as old as the government itself; and its growth has
been virtually as steady as that of the Statutes at Large. The growth has
been pragmatic. Congress has passed laws, and has resorted to the administrative device in the framing of the laws and in the practical effort
to meet particular needs.
The nine executive departments and the eighteen or more independent agencies are examples of administrative agencies, but so also are
the many subdivisions of departments termed "bureaus," "offices," "administrations," "services" and the like, which have a substantial measure
of independence in the department's internal organization and in the
conduct of their adjudicative or rule-making activities. At the time of
the Attorney General's Committee Report, there were 51 administrative
agencies of the type which were deemed to be parts of the administrative process. The war has added to that number about 25 more, making
a total of about 75 strictly administrative agencies. There are, of course,
other agencies which do not have rule-making or adjudicatory powers.
Since the administrative process has developed in this fashion and
without a definite plan, it invites comprehensive study with a view to
coordination and improvement and not blind repeal or emasculating and
unthinking legislation. It should be understood that the administrative
process has deep roots in American history and it should be recognized
that it embodies the practical judgments of successive congresses and
presidents, and of the people. It is no socialistic, foreign ideology,
plotted by the so-called palace guard for the purpose of substituting a
government of men for a government by law. It should be and can be
improved and developed into an ever-increasing instrumentality for efficient government in an increasingly complex society where government
is certain to be charged with more and more functions, which in a simple,
ecnomic society of earlier days were either non-existent or could easily
enough be left to the ordinary legislative, executive or judicial processes.
The American Bar Association has for many years been preparing
itself for leadership in undertaking to effectuate more adequate legislative and judicial guidance or control of the development of administrative law. Through its Special Committee on Administrative Law, first
established in 1933 and continued annually to this time, it had made
many studies and reports to the association.
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In recent years the first substantial recommendation of the Special
Committee on Administrative Law was the establishment of a Federal
Administrative Court.2 That effort proved abortive. It was succeeded
by the legislative proposal known generally as the Walter-Logan bill,
which was sponsored by Congress and vetoed by the President. 3 Shortly
thereafter the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure made its final report, including legislative4 recommendations by both
a majority and a minority of that committee.
The American Bar Association did not adopt either of those measures as its choice, nor did it continue its backing of the Walter-Logan
bill; instead, it adopted a declaration of principles which it felt should
be included in any adequate federal legislation and declared that, of the
existing proposals, that of the minority of the Attorney General's committee more nearly met the principles so declared.'
Thereafter a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held
extensive hearings on the proposals growing out of the Attorney General's committee hearings, 6 but suspended consideration in the summer
of 1941 because of the imminence of war and the then declared national
emergency. Accordingly, for the next year and a half the Special Committee on Administrative Law devoted its energies to the development of
the Conference 7 on Administrative Law and other matter covered in its
annual reports.
The House of Delegates of the association, on August 26, 1943,
adopted recommendations authorizing the Special Committee on Administrative Law (I ) to draft a bill respecting the basic problems and requisites of fair ,administrative procedure, and (2) upon the approval of
such a bill (a) to publicize it and take all necessary steps to secure its
consideration and adoption, and (b) to make special recommendations
to congressional committees with reference to legislative action in connection with specific administrative agencies or powers as may arise. 8
'S. 1835, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 3676, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.: 58 A. B. A. Rep.
203, 426 (1933); 59 A. B. A. Rep. 539 (1934); 60 A. B. A. Rep. 136 (1935);
61 A.B.A.Rep. 220, 237, 721 (1936).
'62 A. B. A. Rep. 262, 790 (1937); 62 A. B. A. Rep. 156, 333 (1937); 63
A. B. A. Rep. 281 (1938) ; 65 A. B. . Rep. 215 (1940): H. R. 6324, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess.; House Doc. No. 986, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.; 66 A. B. A. Rep. 143-144
(1942).
'Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong.,
1stSess. (1941).
'66 A. B. A. Rep. 439 (1941); 67 A. B. A. Rep. 226 (1942); 68 A. B. A.
Rep. 252 (1943).
'Administrative Procedure, on S. 674, S. 675 and S. 918, 77th Cong., Ist Sess.,
three parts plus appendix.
'67 A. B. A. Rep. 226 (1942); 68.A. B. A. Rep. 249 (1943).
'68 A. B. A. Reports 147, 254 (1943).
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A first draft of such general federal legislation accompanied the
1943 report of the committee. A second tentative draft was printed in
30 A. B. A. Journal 7, January, 1944. A further amendment of this
draft was presented to and approved by the House of Delegates, February
28, 1944, and was printed in 30 A. B. A. Journal 226, April, 1944,
and as stated earlier was introduced in the Senate by Senator McCarran
as S. 2030 and in the House by Mr. Sumners as H. B. 5081, 78th Cong.,
2d Sess.9
With this perhaps over-long introduction and background material in mind, I shall now proceed to discuss the purposes, scope and affect
of the bill if enacted and to give an analysis or synopsis of its principal
features with comments interspersed as to what I consider to be its good
and bad points.
The McCarran-Sumners bill is designed primarily to secure publicity of administrative law and procedure, to require that administrative
hearings and decisions shall be conducted in such manner as to preclude
the secret reception of evidence or argument, to restate but not expand
the right of and procedures for judicial review, and to foster the foregoing by requiring an intra-agency segregation of deciding and prosecuting
functions and personnel. No attempt is made to require formal administrative hearings where the law under which the agency operates has not
so required. No attempt is made to limit existing administrative authority. Agencies are simply confined to the scope of their authority.
The proposed act is said by its drafters to be designed to achieve
four essential and simple purposes:
1 (1)
It requires administrative agencies to publish their organizations and procedures, and to make available to public inspection their orders and releases.
"(2)
As to rule making, it requires that agencies publish
notice and at least permit interested parties to submit views or data
for consideration.
"(3)
As to adjudication, it provides that, in the absence of
agreement through informal methods, agencies must accord the
parties notice, hearing, and decision before responsible officers, with
provision for the segregation of deciding and prosecuting functions.
"(4)
As to judicial review, it provides forms of review actions for the determination of all questions of law in all matters
not expressly committed to executive discretion."
The short title of the act is given as the "Administrative Procedure
Act."
9

See Analysis of said bills, 30 A. B. A. Journal 479, August (1944).
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Section 1 defines the terms "Agency," "Rule," "Rule Making,"
"Adjudication" and "Order." The bill is concerned primarily with
administrative agencies, that is, the Congress, the courts the governments
of the possessions, the territories and the District of Columbia are excluded, and to judicial review of their regulatory actions. It applies to
functions rather than enumerated agencies and deals comprehensively
with:
(1) The issuance of "rules," by which is meant the written
statement of any regulation, standard, policy,. interpretation, procedure, requirement, or other writing issued or utilized by any
agency, of general applicability and designed to implement, interpret, or state the law or policy administered by, or the organization
and procedure of any agency; and "rule making" is the administrative procedure for the formulating of a rule, and
(2)
the "adjudication" of particular cases, meaning the
administrative procedure of any agency, and
(3)
the issuance of "orders" by which is meant its disposition or judgment, whether or not affirmative, negative, or declaratory in form, in a particular issuance other than rule making and
without distinction between licensing and other forms of administrative action or authority.
These terms include the three typical administrative functions
which bear upon private rights and parties.
The bill is further limited in scope since war agencies and functions
are excluded in toto, except as to the requirements in Section 2 that they
publish their procedures and make their orders available for public inspection (Section 1), which in turn is not mandatory as to military,
naval or diplomatic functions (Section 2).
No fault is found with respect to the definition section, since the
terms "agency," "rule," "rule making" and "order" are essentially those
included in the Federal Reports Act of 1942,10 the Federal Register Act 11
and the Federal Register Regulations, 1 2 in which the essential language
is "general applicability and legal effect." It is predicted, however, that
many, if not most, old line agencies such as the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Federal Trade Commission will be excluded from
the scope of the act before final passage, and that its terms will be limited
to the newer agencies as was done in the Walter-Logan bill.
Section 2 of the act is headed "Public Information" and requires,
except as to military, naval or diplomatic functions of the United States
requiring secrecy in the public interest, the publication concurrently of
1
(Public No. 831, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Dec. 24, 1942).
"Sec. 4. 5, and 11 (a), 49 Stat. 500, 44 U. S. C. 304, 305 (a) and
121 C. F. R. 2.1 (b), as revised by 6 F. R. 4397.

3

11 (a).

8
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all rules concerning the organization of the agency, substantive regulations, statements of general policy and all procedures; the preservation
and publication, or the making available to public inspection of all rulings on questions of law, and all opinions rendered or orders issued in
the course of adjudications, and the filing of releases with the Division
of the Federal Register. To these provisions are added certain substantive prohibitions regarding the issuance of publicity reflecting adversely
upon any person, product, commodity, security, private activity, or
enterprise otherwise than by issuance of the full texts of authorized public documents, impartial summaries of the positions of all parties to any
controversy, or the issuance of legal notice of public proceedings within
its jurisdiction. These obscure substantive provisions appear to have no
proper place in a procedural act. In many instances pitiless publicity is
a useful device. These last-mentioned provisions would be most difficult
to administer. There is, of course, no objection to giving the public all
possible information through publication, inspection and filing.
Section 3 is an important section on rule making, one of the major
functions of administrative agencies. The first subsection (a) on notice
requires every agency to publish general notice of proposed rule making
including (1) a statement of the time, place and nature of any public
rule-making procedures, (2) reference to the authority under which the
rule is proposed, and (3) a description of the subject and issues involved.
This requirement does not apply to cases in which the agency is authorized by law to issue rules without a hearing and notice is impracticable
because of unavoidable lack of time or other emergency. The subsection
applies only to substantive rules, and is not mandatory as to interpretive
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization or
administrative procedure.
The second subsection (b) provides procedures affording interested
parties an adequate opportunity to participate in rule making through
(1) submission of written data or views, (2) attendance at conferences
or consultations, or (3) presentation of facts or argument at informal
hearings. This subsection applies only to the type of rules for which
notice is required by the first subsection. Where a law specifically requires that rules be issued only upon a formal hearing, separate procedures are set forth in Sections 6 and 7. Public participation in the
rule-making process does not appear to be necessary or desirable to the
extent provided in this subsection. It would prove costly, time consuming and would impede the efficiency and effectiveness of the agency.
The third subsection (c) provides that every agency authorized to
issue rules shall afford any interested person the right to petition for the
issuance, amendment, or recision of any rule. Few agencies have regular
procedures whereby private parties may petition with respect to rules.
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CommitBoth the majority and the minority of the Attorney General's
13
tee proposed that such a provision be included in legislation.
Section 4 of the proposed act covers the subject of "adjudication"
and provides that in every case of administrative adjudication in which
the rights, duties, obligations, privileges, benefits, or other legal relations of any person are required to be determined only after opportunity
for an administrative hearing (except to the extent that there is directly
involved any matter subject to a subsequent trial of the law and facts
de novo in any court notice shall be given [subsection (a) ]).
The introductory double exception to the section removes from the
operations of Sections 4, 6, and 7 all administrative procedures in which
the law concerned does not require rules or orders to be made upon a
hearing and all matters subject to a subsequent trial de novo in any court.
Of the two introductory exceptions, that limiting the adjudication
procedure to those cases in which statutes require a hearing is the more
significant, because thereby are excluded the great mass of administrative
routine as well as pensions, claims, and a variety of similar matters in
which Congress has intentionally or traditionally refrained from requiring an administrative hearing.
The second exception rules out such matters as the tax function of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (which are triable de novo in the Tax
Court), the administration of the custom laws (triable de nouo in the
customs courts), the work of the Patent Office (since judicial proceedings may be brought to try out the right to a patent), and subjects which
might lead to claims determinable subsequently in the Court of Claims.
The second exception also exempts administrative reparation orders
assessing damages, such as are issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Secretary of Agriculture, since such orders are subject to
trial de novo in court upon attempted enforcement.
Subsection (a) of Section 4 provides that the agency shall give due
and adequate notice in writing specifying (I) the time, place, and nature
of the proceedings, (2) the precise legal authority and jurisdiction, and
(3) the matters of fact and law in issue. Adequate notice is certainly a
prerequisite to a fair hearing. "Room remains for considerable improvement in the notice- practice of many agencies. 1 4 A provision is included
which provides that the statement of issues of fact in the words of the
statutes shall not be compliance with the notice requirement.
Subsection (b) provides that in every case after the notice required
by subsection (a) is given, the agency shall afford all interested parties
the right and benefit of fair procedure for the settlement or adjudication
aFinal Report, pp. 195, 230.
"Final Report, Attorney General's Committee. p. 63.
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of all relevant issues through (1) opportunity for informal submission
and full consideration of facts, claims, arguments, offers of settlement, or
proposals of adjustment, and (2) thereafter, to the extent that the parties are unable to determine any controversy by consent, formal hearing
and decision in conformity with Sections 6 and 7. Two lengthy provisions concerning cases resting upon physical inspection or test, permitting
reinspection and retest and providing for summary action in certain cases,
all included. Some agencies either neglect or preclude informal procedures, although now even courts through pretrial proceedings dispose
of much of their business in that way. There is even more reason to do
so in the administrative process, for "informal procedures constitute the
great bulk of administrative adjudication and are truly the lifeblood of
In so far as possible, cases should be disthe administrative process."
posed of through conferences, agreements, or stipulations, hence the inclusion of such informal methods in the act, and their application to
inspections and summary proceedings, will strengthen the administrative
arm and serve well the interests of private parties.
Subsection (c) provides for declaratory rulings upon petition of
any proper party in order to terminate a controversy or to remove uncertainty as to the validity or application of any administrative authority,
rule or order with the same effect and subject to the same judicial review
as in the case of other rules, or orders of the agency. The administrative
process has been slow to adopt declaratory judgment procedures, although courts, particularly state courts, have long recognized the validity
of such procedures. The Attorney General's committee strongly recommended that declaratory rulings be made a part of the administrative
process and subject to judicial review. 16
Section 5 of the bill concerns certain ancillary matters in connection
with any administrative rule making, adjudication, investigation, or
other proceeding or authority, such as appearance, the conduct of investigations, subpoenas and denials.
Subsection (a) of the section recognizes the right of parties to appear before administrative agencies, in person or by counsel and be accorded opportunities and facilities for the negotiation, information,
adjustment, or formal or informal settlement of any case. A provision
recognizes that, in the administrative process, the right to counsel shall
be accorded as of right just as recognized by the Bill of Rights in connection with judicial process, and as proposed by both majority and minority of the Attorney General's committee." A second provision is designed to do what is possible to remedy delays in the administrative
'Final Report, Attorney General's Committee, p. 35.
Final Report, pp. 6, 30-33.
"Final Report, pp. 193, 219.
1
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process, since "expedition in the disposition of cases is commonly a major objective of the administrative process." 1 8 It relieves the private
parties from consequences of unwarranted or avoidable administrative
delay, provides that cases shall be promptly set and determined, and
makes essential provisions for cases in which licenses are required by law
but administrative agencies fail to act. In such cases the licenses are
deemed granted after 60 days.
Subsection (b) relates to the conduct of investigations, stating that
they shall be confined to the jurisdiction and purposes of the agency to
which the authority is delegated.
Subsection (c) relating to subpoenas is designed (I) to assure that
private parties as well as agencies shall have a right to such subpoenas,
(2) limit the showing required of private parties so that they may not
be required to disclose their entire case for the benefit of agency personnel,
and (3) recognize that a private party may contest the validity of an
administrative subpoena issued against him prior to incurring penalties
for disobedience, since otherwise parties may in effect be deprived of all
opportunity to contest the search or seizure involved. The haphazard
and often unfair methods of issuance of administrative subpoenas were
recognized in the Final Report of the Attorney General's committee.'
Subsection (d) provides that every agency shall give prompt notice of denials accompanied by the grounds for such denial and any
further administrative procedures available.
No exception is taken to any of the ancillary matters included in
Section 5.
Section 6 and 7 of the bill are of the greatest importance, since they
provide the essential procedures thought to constitute a full and fair hearing and proper decisions or findings thereafter.
Section 6 on "Hearings" states that no administrative procedure
shall satisfy the requirement of a full hearing unless [subsection (a) I
the case shall be heard (I) by the ultimate authority of the agency or
(2) by one or more subordinate bearing officers designated by the agency
from members of the board or body which comprises the highest authority therein, state representatives authorized by law to preside at the taking of evidence or examiners appointed subject to the civil service or other
laws, at salaries ranging from $3,000 to $9,000. Numerous provisions
are inserted respecting the functions of such presiding officers.
In subsection (b) presiding officers are given power to (1) administer oaths and affirmations, (2) issue subpoenas, (3) rule upon offers of
proof and receive evidence, (4) take or cause depositions to be taken,
SFinal Report, pp. 327, et. seq.
19

Pp. 124-125, 414-415,
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(5) regulate the course of hearings and the conduct of the parties, (6)
hold informal conferences, (7) dispose of motions, etc., and (8) make
or participate in decisions in conformity with Section 7.
Subsection (c) relates to evidence. The principles of relevancy,
materiality, probative force, and substantiality as recognized in judicial
proceedings of an equitable nature shall govern the proof, decision, and
administrative or judicial review of all questions of fact. Thus it appears
that no attempt is made to require the application of the so-called "common law" or "jury trial" rules of evidence in administrative hearings.
This is proper. 20 It is in line with basic principles of evidence followed
among administrative agencies. 2 This subsection contains other pertinent provisions regarding burden of proof, the rights of cross-examination and rebuttal, admission of written evidence, official notice, and a
declaration that no sanction, permission or benefit shall be imposed or
granted, or permission or benefit withheld except upon evidence which
on the whole record is competent, credible, and substantial.
Subsection (d) enumerates the materials which shall constitute the
record and provides that it shall be available to all parties.
Section 7 contains provisions relating to decisions for the initial
submission of briefs, proposed findings and conclusions, and oral argument for consideration in preparing an initial decision, or where subordinate officers preside, an intermediate report, the details of such report
or decision, provisions for administrative review, the consideration of
cases, the findings and opinions and the service thereof upon all the
parties.
The provisions of these two sections on fair hearings and findings
or decisions should serve to meet most of the heated criticisms heretofore
directed against administrative agencies in the conduct of hearings. Most
well-run agencies have already provided for such procedures.
Section 8 relates to penalties and benefits. The first subsection (a)
prohibits the imposition of extra-legal sanctions. Rules may not enlarge
such authority [Subsection (b) ], nor may orders do so [Subsection
(c)]. Subsection (d) prohibits the imposition of burdens in issuing
licenses except as provided by law, or the withdrawal of licenses except
in cases of wilfulness or stated cases of urgency, without warning notices
giving an opportunity for the correction of conduct questioned by the
agency.
Subsection (e) is designed to place limitations upon the retroactive
operation of rules or orders whether such operation is designed as a penalty or for cause. These provisions seem proper and wise.
'Final Report, p. 70.
"Final Report, p. 70.
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Section 9 treats of judicial review and constitutes the longest, most
involved and most controversial features of the proposed act. Chapter
VI of the Final Report of the Attorney General's committee22 gives an
extensive analysis of this important but technical subject from the viewpoint of the majority of the committee. It concludes that dissatisfaction
with the existing standards as to the scope of judicial review derives
largely from dissaisfaction with the fact-finding procedures employed by
the administrative bodies, that is, whether or not such action inspires
confidence, and assumes that if the notice, hearings and finding procedures
are adopted as recommended they will obviate the reasons for change in
the area and scope of judicial review.
However, the minority of the committee, Messrs. McFarland, Stason and Vanderbilt, was of the contrary opinion and thought that Congress should provide by general legislation for both the availability and
scope of judicial review. " It therefore included in its proposed bill a
quite elaborate section on judicial review. 24 In successive drafts, and in
the proposed act here under discussion, the judicial review section became
increasingly elaborate and involved until it either means nothing at all
or else its adoption would result in seriously crippling the administrative
process and impose upon the courts a hopeless burden and thus substitute
the judicial for the administrative process.
With this background, I shall attempt as briefly as possible to describe the contents of Section 9 on judicial review.
There is an introductory limitation by which there is excluded any
matter subject to a subsequent trial de novo or judicial review in any
legislative court such as the Customs Court, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, the Tax Court, or the Court of Claims.
Subsection (a) provides that any party adversely affected by any
administrative action, rule or order within the purview of the act or
otherwise presenting any issue of law shall be entitled to judicial review
thereof in accordance with this section, and reviewing courts are given
plenary power with respect thereto. I shall not attempt here to make
crystal clear what "an issue of law" is as distinguished from "an issue of
fact" or a mixed issue of law and fact. I suspect the courts will wrestle
with that problem for a long, long time.
Subsection (b) states the types of available review proceedings that
are statutory and non-statutory and enumerates declaratory judgments
as one such type. A further provision authorizes an action for review
against the agency by its official title as well as the head officer or officers,
or any of them.
'Pp. 75-95.
'Final Report, pp. 209-212.
"Section 311, Final Report, pp. 245-247.
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Subsection (c) relates to courts and venue, and contains provisions
as to the transfer of review proceedings, amendment thereof, and general
provisions to assure that the rights of parties will not be defeated by
of law defects pointed out by the
complicated court and venue provisions
25
Attorney General's committee.
Subsection (d) on reviewable acts, states that any rule shall be reviewable upon its judicial or administrative application or threatened
application, and, whether or not declaratory or negative in form or substance, except those matters expressly committed by law to absolute
executive discretion. Only final actions, rules or orders, or those for
which there is no other adequate judicial remedy are reviewable; in other
words, a recognition of the principle of the exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
Subsection (e) deals with interim relief, such as stay orders, in
elaborate fashion.
Subsection (f), on scope of review, is the heart of Section 9. The
drafting committee states this subsection does not attempt to expand the
scope of judicial review, nor reduce it directly by implication. "Nor is
it possible to specify all instances in which judicial review may operate.
Subsection (f) , therefore, seeks merely to restate the several categories of
questions of law subject to judicial review."
The essential words are directly quoted:
"* * * Upon such review, the court shall hold unlawful such act
or set aside such application, rule, order, or any administrative finding
or conclusion made, sanction or requirement imposed, or permission or
benefit withheld to the extent that it finds them (1) arbitrary or capricious; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory authority, jurisdiction, or limitations or
short of statutory right, grant, privilege, or benefit; (4) made or issued
without due observance of procedures required by law; (5) unsupported
by competent, material, and substantial evidence, upon the whole record
as reviewed by the court, in any case in which the action, rule, or order
is required by statute to be taken, made or issued after administrative
hearing, or (6) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts in
any case are subject to trial de noo by the reviewing court."
Every clause, phrase and word of this quotation deserves extensive
ad intensive study to determine its true significance. What its effect
would be in actual operation no one can say. As a whole I am of the
opinion that this subsection goes entirely too far, is dangerous and would
result in an impossible substitution of the judicial for the administrative
process and thus deprive our jurisprudence of that process or else delay
'Final Report, pp. 92-95, 201-202.

DICTA
its proper and normal development. This subsection constitutes a bold
and ambitious effort on the part of the critics of administrative law to
kill it or nullify it before it has had an opportunity to prove its true
worth. Similarly, conservative common law judges and lawyers have
fought the development of equity and most every other judicial reform.
Subsection (g) provides that judgments of original courts of review shall be appealable in accordance with equity law and in the absence thereof, by the Supreme Court upon writs of certiorari.
Subsection (b) recognizes that all other provisions of law relating
to judicial review shall remain in effect unless inconsistent with Section 9,
except where Congress has forbidden it or broadened it.
Section 10 relates to separations of functions so as to achieve an
internal segregation of deciding and prosecuting personnel. The minority of the Attorney General's committee thought that there should be a
complete separation of functions-that is that hearings should be held
and decisions made by an administrative tribunal separate from the
agency engaged in investigations and prosecutions or by a court. 26 The
majority of the committee thought this unnecessary and undesirable,
holding that the problem is simply one of isolating those who engage in
the adjudicative activity. 27 This section follows quite closely the view
of the majority rather than of the minority.
Section 11, the concluding section of the proposed act, includes
the usual provisions respecting the construction and effect of the act and
certain other technical matters.
The proposed Administrative Act represents one of three conflicting doctrines of public administration now struggling for domination of
the federal government. Blachley and Oatman in "Federal Regulatory
Action and Control" have called these three doctrines (1) the doctrine
of executive management; (2) the doctrine of the judicial formula; (3)
the revisionist doctrine.
The essential feature of the doctrine of executive management is
the assertion that all administrative activities of the federal government
(except those of a quasi-judicial nature) should be under the control of
the Chief Executive.
Those who advocate the doctrine of the judicial formula would
require the administrative process to act in so far as possible, according
to the judicial formula of notice and hearing followed by a decision,
and would subject to judicial review practically every act which would
even remotely affect personal and property rights.
'Final Report, pp. 203-209.
Final Report, pp. 55-57.
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The revisionist doctrine sees in the present federal administrative
system a fairly satisfactory adaptation of structure and relationship to
function. At the same time it advocates improvement.
There are many objections to the first doctrine which need not be
developed here.
The doctrine of the judicial formula of public administration is
largely the product of the Special Committee of the American Bar Association, the activities of which have been mentioned herein. The chief
criticism of the present system offered by it and the association may be
expressed in two words, "administrative absolutism." The proposals
of the committee at various stages have been embodied in bills which
have been mentioned and in the proposed Administrative Act just described and commented upon. In my opinion the doctrine of the judicial
formula as embodied in the act is wrong in its fundamental objectives.
Although some of the doubtful features from a constitutional standpoint
and some of the most rash departures of earlier bills have been eliminated
in the proposed act, yet its animating purpose, the desire to subject every
possible disagreement between the individual and the administrative
agency to complete control by the courts, is opposed to the inevitable,
necessary and useful evolution of administrative procedures and administrative and judicial controls that have been a notable feature of the
federal government during more than a half century. The theory is
based on the moribund concept that law cannot prevail or justice be done
except through the courts. It fails to accord to the administrative process
the degree of power and finality which the courts themselves, applying
the laws under the Constitution of the United States, have recognized as
belonging to that process. It looks backward and tries to revive the very
system of judicial regulation of business and industry which proved so
impossible as to lead to the establishment of regulatory agencies. It
destroys and is not constructive. It offers no real protection to the citizen
but does menace effective administration. It rests upon dead theory instead of evolving reality. The doctrine of the judicial formula should be
discarded and rejected. It appears that the "tendencies toward administrative absolutism," so feared by certain advocates of the proposed act
and its predecessors, are largely non-existent.
The revisionist doctrine, on the other hand, sees in the present system of federal administration a vast complex of organizations performing a multitude of functions, employing a wide variety of methods and
procedures, and subjected to numerous types of control, carried on within
a constitutional framework, based on individual rights, adequately protected. The administrative process has developed step by step to meet
everyday needs. Changes which are necessary should be made to improve
it and should not be designed to destroy it. It was with this idea in mind
that the Attorney General's committee was appointed in 1939 and car-
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tied on its painstaking research for two years or more. Its Final Report
is an imperative for one who would be fully informed of the issues involved here. The majority of the committee recommended (1) the
establishment of an Office of Administrative Procedure under a director
with an advisory committee; (2) the publication of rules and other information, and certain safeguards with respect to rule making; (3) administrative adjudication through a system of independent intra-agency
hearing commissioners such as is now in use in the OPA, and (4) the
power to issue declaratory rulings. Specific recommendations were made
concerning individual agencies, many of which recommendations have
been adopted. It made no suggestions for judicial review. It summarily
rejected the idea of the minority of the committee that it was feasible to
draft a "Code of Standards of Fair Administrative Procedure," although
such a code was included in the Final Report, and as I have indicated the
proposed act is its present form.
Progress in the administrative process can be made (1) by maintaining the independence of regulatory agencies; (2) by further developing administrative rule making and adjudication; (3) by more exact
differentiation of the various forms of administrative action, and (4)
by simplifying administrative judicial procedure, and, where possible,
by making it more uniform.
These things will leave the administrative system intact, will add
to its strength and stability, and will broaden and develop it to meet the
expanding needs of a living democratic society. The adoption of the
proposed act would have quite the opposite effect.
Help!
The Selective Service Advisory Board is seriously up against it
because of a scarcity of attorneys willing to devote one hour a week to
assist in processing selectees. A couple of years ago, it was different as
there were plenty of volunteers and lots of work. The work dropped
off and at times the attorney would sit over at headquarters for his hour
with nothing to do. He thus gained the impression that he really wasn't
needed and got out of the habit of going. It is necessary for someone to
be on the job every hour, even though he might not be particularly busy,
as otherwise some selectees might not receive help. A few of the faithful
are still on the job, and are being worked overtime.
It will be greatly appreciated if lawyers will volunteer for this
patriotic duty. It shouldn't be too great a hardship to devote one hour
a week to helping the eighteen-year-olds and those discharged from the
armed forces.
Please write or telephone W. D. Wright, Jr., 722 Symes Building,
Keystone 7941, and say "Yes."
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TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION,
GREETING:
The honor of the presence of yourselves and your wives, husbands,
ladies and escorts is requested at a joint Dinner Meeting of The Colorado
Bar Association and The Denver Bar Association on Saturday evening,
February 24, 1945, at 7 o'clock P. M. in the Lincoln Room of the ShirleySavoy Hotel, Denver, Colorado.

The Speaker:

The Toastmaster:

HONORABLE DAVID A. SIMMONS
President of
The American Bar Association and
Immediate Past President of
The American Judicature Society

HONORABLE HENRY MCALLISTER
Of the Denver Bar

ADDITIONAL ENTERTAINMENT BY THE
"MEN OF THE WEST" QUARTET AND BY
MILTON SHREDNIK'S KOA STRING TRIO
The Dinner will be informal and the price $2.00, which will include
tax and tip. Please purchase tickets from, or make reservations with,
either of the undersigned Secretaries promptly because food rationing
requires us to make an accurate attendance guarantee.

BENJAMIN E. SWEET
President of The
Colorado Bar Association

WM. HEDGES ROBINSON, JR.
Secretary of The
Colorado Bar Association
Equitable Building
Denver, Colorado

MILTON J. KEEGAN
President of The
Denver Bar Association

DONALD M. LESHER
Secretary of The
Denver Bar Association
E. & C. Building
Denver, Colorado

